When General Early returned his men to their former lines during the evening of May 2, his focus had still been on the positions south, towards Prospect Hill. Sedgwick’s force was still stationed there and Early did not expect them to try an assault on Marye’s Heights considering the disaster of December 1862. Instead, Early expected the Federals to try an attack on the location of the successful Union breakthrough in the previous engagement, or perhaps a drive up Deep Run to divide the Confederate force in two.

Now, however, Sedgwick was moving north and Early was unsure of the Union plan. Early, correctly, assumed that Sedgwick did not want to try another frontal assault against Marye’s Heights. However, the Union forces were congregating in Fredericksburg, where Early had stationed the smaller part of his force to hold the heights. The main defending force at the heights was the Mississippi Brigade of Brig. Gen. William Barksdale. The 18th Mississippi held the Sunken Road behind the stone wall with three companies of the 21st Mississippi. The rest of the 21st MS was between “Brompton” and the Orange Plank Road while on the other side of Marye’s Heights the 17th and 13th Mississippi extended to Lee’s Hill. Eight artillery pieces spanned Marye’s Heights: six guns from the Washington Artillery and two guns of Parker’s Richmond Battery. On May 2, concerned about a thrust up Deep Run, Early had shifted the 6th and 9th Louisiana of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays’ brigade up to positions near Lee’s and Howison Hills. The majority of Early’s force remained on the southern end of the line.

Barksdale became increasingly concerned that the Union force in Fredericksburg was steadily growing through the early morning of May 3. He sent a messenger to Early requesting reinforcements and Hays (who was positioned with the rest of his units on the south end of the line) was ordered north to reinforce Marye’s Heights. The 5th, 7th, and 8th Louisiana moved to take up positions to Barksdale’s left, on Stansbury Heights. Hays’ men took up the far left position of the Confederate line in response to Gibbons’ II Corps force starting to march north of Fredericksburg to attack the Confederate flank. After marching quickly up the entire 8-mile Confederate line, Hays’ men arrived at the heights exhausted. 

Also watching the Union movements with concern was Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox whose brigade was stationed near Banks’s Ford to protect the river crossing. All day on May 2 he watched a large amount of Union activity (Reynolds’ I Corps marching towards Hooker at Chancellorsville) and on the morning of May 3 he saw only a small force remaining across the river dressed to march. Realizing that the Union force likely would not be crossing at Banks’ Ford, he left a small force of 50 men of the 15th VA cavalry and two artillery guns to protect the crossing and prepared to move west to support Lee at Chancellorsville.

Confederate pickets on Taylor Hill, north of Stansbury Heights, saw Gibbon’s movement and sent word to Wilcox. Wilcox changed his decision to move towards Lee and redirected his brigade towards Fredericksburg. After consulting with Barksdale and Hays, Wilcox positioned his men on Taylor Hill, stationing two artillery guns with his infantry and sending four down to Stansbury Ridge to oppose Gibbon’s advance. 

Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville, 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

Gallagher, Gary W. The Battle of Chancellorsville. National Park Civil War Series. Eastern National, 2007.

Parsons, Philip W. The Union Sixth Army Corps in the Chancellorsville Campaign: A Study of the Engagements of Second Fredericksburg, Salem Church and Banks’s Ford, May 3-4, 1863. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006.

Sutherland, Daniel E. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: The Dare Mark Campaign. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.