Salem Church, Part X: Lee had planned for an offensive against Sedgwick early on May 4, but there were significant delays getting Anderson’s reinforcements into position between Early and McLaws. Lee’s attack began at 5:30pm with Early and Anderson’s troops attacking from the south and east. McLaws was to follow-up with an attack from the west, but his troops never engaged with the Union line. 

Early on May 4^th, General Lee had hoped for a coordinated assault against the VI Corps in the morning; instead, a general attack did not step off until after 5:00 that afternoon. When the signal guns fired around 5:30pm Early’s Division attacked against the Union left, the Second Division of Brigadier General Albion Howe. Having already been attacked by Early that day and suspecting that the Confederates would try to turn the Union flank and cut off access to Scotts’ Ford, Howe had positioned his men into two defensive lines between the Plank Road and Rappahannock River. Gordon’s brigade aimed for the Union flank while the brigades of Brigadier Generals Harry T. Hays and Robert F. Hoke attacked closer to the Plank Road. In the rough terrain the edges of Hays and Hoke’s brigades got tangled and Hoke’s men accidently fired into their comrades.

Howe’s front line, consisting largely of Neill’s Third Brigade, met the Confederate attack with a counterattack, leading to a fierce fight along Howe’s entire front. For a time the Union line held and punished the oncoming Confederates, especially as Hoke and Hays’ brigades became tangled. Eventually the Confederate pressure caused Howe’s advance line to break and fall back to the position of his reserve line. Once Neill’s line fell back, the Confederate push hit Howe’s second line. Because of the angle of Early’s assault and the goal to turn the Union flank/possibly cut them off from the Rappahannock, the Confederates hit the Union left regiments of the 4^th Vermont and 26^th New Jersey. The 26^th New Jersey began to buckle as Confederate soldiers started to flank their position and to Lee and Early watching from the rear it appeared that the first phase of the Confederate assault was about to be a success.

The Union force reacted quickly to the attack on Howe’s front. As Neill’s advance line broke and made for the rear, Sedgwick’s Chief of Artillery (Col. Charles Tompkins) pulled batteries from Newton’s line and sent them in support of Howe. Artillery batteries from Neill’s front line reformed on the reserve line and restarted their fire towards the Confederates. In addition, Union artillery from across the Rappahannock trained their guns on Early’s force putting the Confederate force under artillery fire from front, rear, and flank. Two regiments—the 31^st New York and 5^th Wisconsin—were brought from Col. Hirman Burnham’s Light Division to help on Howe’s left. Howe also quickly reported to Sedgwick for help and Newton sent Wheaton’s brigade from his division to reinforce the right side of Howe’s line.

Early’s assault was angled towards the Rappahannock with the aim of cutting Sedgwick off from Scott’s Ford, the Union’s only retreat point. Because of this trajectory and the uneven terrain in front of Howe’s lines, the Confederates ended up moving across the front of part of Howe’s concealed reserve line. The 2^nd, 3^rd, and 6^th Vermont of Colonel Lewis Grant’s brigade surprised the Confederates with volleys of fire into their flanks. The fire from the Vermonters did great damage to the Confederates in their front, but did not yet break Early’s assault. The colonel of the 6^th Vermont, Elisha L. Barney, ordered his men to charge the Confederates and they were joined by the reformed 26^th New Jersey. This charge broke the momentum of the Confederate assault and caused Early’s Division to retreat.

Early called up reserve regiments from Brig. Gen. William Smith’s brigade and his division officers tried to reorganize the retreating brigades. However, darkness fell while he was reorganizing his men and Early decided it was too dark to continue his assault. 

Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville, 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Vintage Books, 1992.

Gallagher, Gary W. The Battle of Chancellorsville. National Park Civil War Series. Eastern National, 2007.

Parsons, Philip W. The Union Sixth Army Corps in the Chancellorsville Campaign: A Study of the Engagements of Second Fredericksburg, Salem Church and Banks’s Ford, May 3-4, 1863. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006.

Sutherland, Daniel E. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville: The Dare Mark Campaign. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.